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188 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
der to make an affidavit there must be present the officer, the affiant, and
the paper, and there must be something done which amounts to the adminis-
tration of an oath. There must be some solemnity, not mere telephone talk.
Telephonic affidavits are unknown to the law. A moment's thought will
show a sound reason for th. An officer hears a voice coming thru the re-
ociver of a telephone. For identification he must rely on recognition of the
voice (if he knows it) and the statement of the person as to who he or she
is. How does 2he notary know that the paper presented later is the identical
paper sworn to? If this is an oath, when is it taken-when the telephone
message is sent, or when the paper is later presented by the third person?
Where is it taken-.* the place where the affiant is. or that where the officer
is? It will be seen that great confusion might arise from such a system."
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT--CONTINGENT FEE-DISMISSAL O(F
SUIT BY CLIENT.
Kellogg v. Winchell, 273 Fed. 745 (D. C.) The plaintiff directed his at-
txney, who was engaged upon a onitingent fee, to dismiss an appeal from a
judgment against him in the lower court.
It is well established that a client may dismiss his attorney at any time
and without cause, although this attorney be employed on a contingent fee.
Ronald v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Amoc. 30 Fed. 228; Roake v. Palmer,
103 N. Y. S. 862; Joseph v. Lopp 78 S. W. 1119 (Ky.). But the courts will
not permit such act of dismissal to deprive the attorney of renumeration
for services rendered. There are three ways in case of contingent fees in
which attorney may recover for services. (1) The Attorney may sue his client
in cotra.L Kersey v. Gorton, 77 Mo 645; Reynolds v. Clark 162 Mo680.
The objectionable feature to this remedy is that it seems impossible to deter-
mine damages if this suit is not concluded.
(2) The agreen4t nmy be treated as a mere promise to pay a pQrt of
a claim when collected. Story v. Hull, 143 IlL, 506.
(3) This remedy is to allow the attorney a quantum meruit for the
reasonable value of his wrvices. Ibert v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 213 Fed- 996
(D. C.). Jordan v. Davis 172 Mo, 599; Moonm v. Robinon 92 III. 491; Phil-
brook v. Moxey 191 Mass. 33. And this appears to be the most reasonabk
and just osIU to follow.
DOWER-CREDITORS' RIGHTS BEFORE IT IS ASSIGNED.
The recent case of Clelland v. Celland, 235 S. W. (Mo.) 816, was an
action to have a widow's dower assigned in her husbands real estate, brought
by a judgment creditor of the widow to satisfy his claim out of the portion
so assigned. Sec. 347, R. S. Mibeouri 1919, provides that if dower has not
Washington University Open Scholarship
RECENT DECISIONS 189
been mgned to a widow, her judgment creditor ray institute proceedings to
have it auine4 so that her share of the real estate may be set apart and
levied upon by him. This stut recognizes the common law rule that a
widow's dower, which becomes cawsunzmte upon the death of her husband,
is a mere chose in action until it i assigned; Waller v. Mardus, 29 Mo. 25;
Young v. The r, 61 Mo. App. 413; Carey v. West 139 Mo. 177; 30 L P.
A. (N. S.) lo. dt. 117, sowe; and so mnnot be levied upon as real estate
by a judgmuent creditor of the widow. This statute affords the creditor an
adequate remedy If dower has not been assigned.
However, it seems in this case that the plaintiff had previously mused
execution to be Issued upon the judgment and the land to be levied upon and
sold by the sheriff at judicial sale, and also had received the proceeds oi the
sale. The court held that the sale of the widow's interest under execution,
before dower had been amdgned, was void. But it was held that the plaintiff
was estopwed to deny the validity of the sale which was in fact void because
Ie had accepted the purchase money of said sale and had uot offered to put
the purchaser in gau quo.
The commoi, law rule with regard to the transfer by the widow of her
unasigned dower has been dhanged in Missouri by sec. 316, Rev. Star- 1919,
which authorizes her to convey the dower interest before assignmeft
NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE DOCTRINE -PECULIAR
APPLICATION.
The facts in the case of Hammack v. Payne, Agent, et al, 235 S. W.
467 (Mo.). show that while plaintiff was passing over the railroad tracks at
a highway crossing between swations of Wyeth and Rea in Andrew County,
Missouri. he was struck by a Chicago Great Western Railroad train. His
automobile was destroyed and he was seriously injured. He brought action
for $10,000 damages for his injuries. In the lower court judgment was given
for the plaintiff but in the Kansas City Court of Appeals the judgment was
reversed on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence
in not looking both up and down the railroad tracks before driving thereon.
As bearing upon this case a part of the opinion of Kelsay v. Railroad, 129
Mo. loc. cit. 372, is set out :-"This duty requires him (traveler upon the high-
way) to look carefully in both directions at a convenient distance from the
crossing before verituring upon it, if by looking a train could be tem. He
cannot close his eyes and thereby relieve himself of the consequence of hit
own neglect." Upon this point there seems to be some contrariety of opinion
based on the doctrine of the "last clear chance." In the case of Nicol v.
Oregon-Washington Railroad & Nay. Co. 71 Wash. 409, plaintiff attempted
to go over a railroad crossing in an automobile but while upon the tracl the
machine became stalled. Shortly after, said machine was struck by a rail-
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